World of Wires, a play inspired by the simulation argument, New York (2012)
The
Simulation Argument
Here you can peruse
the debate that followed the paper presenting the simulation argument.
The original paper is here, as are popular synopses, scholarly papers
commenting or expanding on or critiquing the first paper, and some replies by the author.
(The simulation argument continues to attract a great deal of attention. I apologize that I cannot usually
respond to individual inquiries. I hope that you will find what you're looking for on this page!)
"The Simulation Argument is perhaps the first interesting argument for the existence of a Creator in 2000 years."
David Pearce (exaggerated compliment)
"Thank you so much,
Dr. Bostrom. You have proved that my psychiatrist was wrong all along."
Anonymous correpondent (misfiring
compliment)
The original paper presenting the simulation
argument:
ABSTRACT. This paper argues that at least
one of the following propositions is true: (1) the human species is very
likely to go extinct before reaching a “posthuman” stage; (2) any posthuman
civilization is extremely unlikely to run a significant number of simulations
of their evolutionary history (or variations thereof); (3) we are almost
certainly living in a computer simulation. It follows that the belief that
there is a significant chance that we will one day become posthumans who
run ancestor-simulations is false, unless we are currently living in a simulation.
A number of other consequences of this result are also discussed.
ABSTRACT. If you might be living in a simulation then
all else equal you should care less about others, live more for today, make
your world look more likely to become rich, expect to and try more to participate
in pivotal events, be more entertaining and praiseworthy, and keep the famous
people around you happier and more interested in you.
ABSTRACT. Those who believe suitably programmed computers could
enjoy conscious experience of the sort we enjoy must accept the possibility
that their own experience is being generated as part of a computerized simulation.
It would be a mistake to dismiss this is just one more radical sceptical
possibility: for as Bostrom has recently noted, if advances in computer
technology were to continue at close to present rates, there would be a
strong probability that we are each living in a computer simulation. The
first part of this paper is devoted to broadening the scope of the argument:
even if computers cannot sustain consciousness (as many dualists and materialists
believe), there may still be a strong likelihood that we are living simulated
lives. The implications of this result are the focus of the second part
of the paper. The topics discussed include: the Doomsday argument, scepticism,
the different modes of virtual life, transcendental idealism, the Problem
of Evil, and simulation ethics.
Living
in a Simulated Universe. John D. Barrow (2007) in Universe or Multiverse? ed. Bernard Carr (Cambridge University Press): pp. 481-486. [pdf]
ABSTRACT. We explain why, if we live in a simulated reality, we
might expect to see occasional glitches and small drifts in the supposed
constants and laws of Nature over time.
SUMMARY. On several Brains-in-vats and Matrix-like scenarios. Argues in support
of what is also my contention, that the simulation-hypothesis is not a radical
skeptical hypothesis.
Are
You a Sim? Brian Weatherson (2003) Philosophical
Quarterly, Vol. 53: 425-31. [pdf]
SUMMARY. Weatherson is prepared to accept the Simulation Argument up to, but not
including, the final step, in which I use the Bland Principle of Indifference.
In this paper, he examines four different ways to understand this principle
and argues that none of them serves the purpose. (For my reply, see the
paper below.) Note that Weatherson accepts the third disjunct in the conclusion
of the Simulation Argument - i.e. that there are many more simulated human-like
persons than non-simulated ones. By contrast, I do not accept this: I think
we currently lack grounds for eliminating either of the three disjuncts.
SUMMARY. My reply to Weatherson's paper (above). I argue
he has misinterpreted the relevant indifference principle and that he has
not provided any sound argument against the correct interpretation, nor
has he addressed the arguments for this principle that I gave in the original
paper. There also a few words on the difference between the Simulation Argument
and traditional brain-in-a-vat arguments, and on so-called epistemological
externalism.
SUMMARY. My response to Brueckner (above), in which I argue that he has misconstrued the simulation argument. I also argue that he is mistaken in his critique of the idea that simulated beings may themselves create ancestor-simulations.
ABSTRACT. A future society will very
likely have the technological ability and the motivation to create large
numbers of completely realistic historical simulations and be able to overcome
any ethical and legal obstacles to doing so. It is thus highly probable
that we are a form of artificial intelligence inhabiting one of these simulations.
To avoid stacking (i.e. simulations within simulations), the termination
of these simulations is likely to be the point in history when the technology
to create them first became widely available, (estimated to be 2050). Long
range planning beyond this date would therefore be futile.
ABSTRACT. Nick Bostrom’s Simulation Argument (SA) has many intriguing theological implications. We work out some of them here. We show how the SA can be used to develop novel versions of the Cosmological and Design Arguments. We then develop some of the affinities between Bostrom’s naturalistic theogony and more traditional theological topics. We look at the resurrection of the body and at theodicy. We conclude with some reflections on the relations between the SA and Neoplatonism (friendly) and between the SA and theism (less friendly).
ABSTRACT. This article reports on a newly discovered bug in the original simulation argument. Two different ways of patching the argument are proposed, each of which preserves the original conclusion.
ABSTRACT. Some theists maintain that they need not answer the threat posed to theistic belief by natural evil; they have reason enough to believe that God exists and it renders impotent any threat that natural evil poses to theism. Explicating how God and natural evil co-exist is not necessary since they already know both exist. I will argue that, even granting theists the knowledge they claim, this does not leave them in an agreeable position. It commits the theist to a very unpalatable position: our universe was not designed by God and is instead, most likely, a computer simulation.
SUMMARY. A low-level physics simulation using the simplest simulation methods, which simulated our universe on a grid with finite resolution, would result in some potentially observable distortions of the simulated physics because of the rotational symmertry breaking effects of the simulation lattice. I would think that even the earlist simulations of systems sufficiently complex to contain observers would make use of powerful computational shortcuts that would eliminate the opportunity to observe any such discrepancies (mostly the simulation would take place at a much higher level of abstraction in order to reduce the computational demands).
On the 'Simulation Argument' and selective skepticism Jonathan Birch (2013). Erkenntnis, Vol. 78, No. 1, pp. 95-107 [requires journal subscription] NEW
SUMMARY. Develops an objection similar to the one discussed under question 4 in the Q&A.
The Simulation Argument William Eckhardt (2013). In Paradoxes in Probability Theory (Springer), chapter 4 [book link] NEW
SUMMARY. A critical discussion in the context of the doomsday argument.
The Doomsday Argument and the Simulation Argument Peter J. Lewis (2013). Synthese, January [requires journal subscription] NEW
SUMMARY. Analyzes some analogies and disanalogies between the doomsday argument and the simulation argument, and concludes that the former fails whille the latter succeeds.
Some background
readings:
Traditional philosophical skepticism and brain-in-a-vat arguments:
Welt am Draht Film, directed by Rainer Fassbinder (1973). (Trevor Levick suggests
this might be the original of all Matrix-type films.)
Note: This is not a complete list. Others include Simulacron
III (1963), aka Counterfeit World, by Daniel F. Galouye,
which was made into the movie Welt Am Draht (1973) by Rainer Werner
Fassbinder (The Thirteenth Floor was also based on Simulacron
III); Exit to Reality (1997) by Edith Forbes; Otherland by Tad Williams (1996-2001); the film Dark City (1950, 1998); eXistenZ (film directed by David Cronenberg, 1999); many stories by Philip K. Dick; Realtime Interrupt (1995) by James P. Hogan, etc. etc. Jay Shreib produced a play inspired by the simulation argument, World of Wires, which opened in New York in January 2012.
Professor Bostrom is a philosopher at Oxford University. He is the director of the Future of Humanity Institute. His homepage is at http://www.nickbostrom.com.
